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threshold differs between various types of taxes and shows that there is a clear-cut
ranking in terms of welfare effects, depending on which of the three types of funding of
unemployment beneﬁts mentioned above is chosen.
This book is a quality publication, and the author should be congratulated for
his useful theoretical research and his talented analysis. Nevertheless, given the
rather narrow focus of his study and its technical nature, one can wonder whether a
series of specialized articles, rather than a book form, may have been a more
appropriate form for the dissemination of this research. While mathematical modeling
of trade issues has its uses, one should also admit its limitations. As noted by
Professor Wassily Leontief – one of the pioneers of econometrics and the 1973 Nobel
Prize winner – ‘uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulations tends often to
conceal the ephemeral content of the argument’ (Leontief, 1977). In that sense,
the volume is likely to provide limited guidelines for the practitioners of trade
policy-making.
Three of the four chapters are clearly written as self-contained academic papers,
and no adjustments were made to coordinate the various parts in order to provide the
necessary consistency. The reader will also miss a list of abbreviations and an index – an
unfortunate omission, since numerous abbreviations and technical concepts are used in
the text. Nevertheless, the bibliography included in the volume provides a useful listing
of the recent studies on trade and unemployment. In sum, the volume of Dr de Pinto
provides a useful reading for theoretical economists interested in trade issues and labor
markets.
MICHEL KOSTECKI, The Enterprise Institute, Université de Neuchâtel,
Switzerland
References
Dicken, Peter (2011), Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy, Thousand
Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Hoekman, B. and L. Kostecki (2009), The Political Economy of the World Trading System, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Leontief, W. (1977), Essays in Economics: Theories, Facts and Policies, New York: M.E. Sharp.
Melitz, M. J. (2003), ‘The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and aggregate Industry
Productivity’, Econometrica, 71(6): 1695–1725.
De Pinto,Marco (2014), ‘International Trade and Unemployment – theWorker-selection Effect’,Review of
International Economics, January 2014, http://ideas.repec.org/p/mar/magkse/201127.html.
doi:10.1017/S1474745614000184
Regulation of Foreign Investment: Challenges to International
Harmonization
edited by Zdenek Drabek and Petros C. Mavroidis
World Scientiﬁc Publishing Company, 2013
Drabek and Mavroidis have compiled an edition that is at once descriptive and
prescriptive, addressing the current state of regulation of foreign investment, the ability
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of existing domestic, bilateral and multilateral tools to meet the regulatory challenges
faced by foreign investors and host states alike, and the desirability of scaling up and
harmonizing the regulatory effort.
The book is an insightful foray into a subject of considerable signiﬁcance for a broad
audience. That said, the editors do the work a disservice by failing to identify clearly the
recurring themes that run throughout the work, or to organize the authors’
contributions around those themes. Accordingly, in this review, we make our own
modest effort to distil, as an organizing principle, the two major themes explored by the
book’s editors and authors. The ﬁrst theme involves the identiﬁcation and evaluation of
a number of foreign-investment-related issues that the authors consider to be under-
regulated by current rules. The second theme involves an assessment of the degree of
fragmentation in foreign investment regulation, followed by a prescriptive assessment
of the degree of harmonization the authors consider desirable.
Beginning with the ﬁrst major theme, the ﬁrst issue asserted to be under-regulated
by foreign investment (and international trade) rules involves labor standards.
In Chapter 4,1 Brown, Deardorff, and Stern catalogue research asserting that trade
and investment liberalization alleviates poverty by, inter alia, increasing economic
growth and equilibrium income, enabling labor, at least at a macro level, to secure a
bigger piece of the economic pie, through higher wages and improved working
conditions. At the same time, the authors highlight circumstances in which liberal-
ization without the integration of labor standards increases poverty and aggravates
poor working conditions by creating a globalised environment in which governments
reduce labor standards so as to ‘gain a competitive edge’.2 The authors make a good
case for the proposition that, because international trade and investment rules facilitate
the very market integration that creates this effect, rule-makers have a particular
responsibility to integrate labor standards into those rules. They highlight empirical
evidence suggesting that the implementation of labor standards into international rules
does not encourage foreign direct investment to ﬂee, and that instead capital is drawn
due to the labor market stability that basic labor protections bring.
The second such issue concerns the ‘trade-subsidy–investment nexus’,3 or, in other
words, the regulation of the effects government subsidies have on international
investment and international trade. In Chapter 5,4 Broude critiques the multilateral
rules on subsidies embodied in the WTO Agreement for a singular focus on the
distortive effect on government subsidies on international trade, without considering
the effects of subsidies on foreign direct investment. The author’s premise is that
concerns about the effects of subsidies on investment are distinct from concerns about
the effects of subsidies on trade, such that rules designed to regulate the latter cannot be
effective, and may be counterproductive, in regulating the former. Moreover, Broude
critiques the WTO subsidies regime as ‘difﬁcult to justify’ even when viewed solely from
1Chapter 4, Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, ‘Labor Standards and Human
Rights: Implications for International Trade and Investment’.
2 Chapter 4, p. 183.
3 Chapter 5, p. 198.
4 Chapter 5, Tomer Broude, ‘Interactions Between Subsidies Regulation and Foreign Investment, and the
Primacy of the International Trade Regime’.
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the trade-related objectives it sets out to achieve because it ‘only partially . . . and
inchoately’ regulates the effects of subsidies on trade, ‘without regulating services
subsidies’.5
Broude’s conclusions are incomplete in some respects. While correctly identifying the
‘unbridled international competition over foreign direct investment (FDI) that would
lead to inefﬁcient over-investment both nationally and at the aggregate international
level’ as the ‘chief systemic concern raised by subsidies in the investment ﬁeld’,6 Broude
incorrectly concludes that WTO subsidies rules disregard the effects of subsidies on
FDI. The author is overly dismissive of the WTO prohibition of subsidies contingent on
the use of domestic over imported content which, while admittedly incomplete,7
imposes an important safeguard against the use of subsidies to distort the distribution
of FDI. By virtue of this prohibition, governments cannot use subsidies to distort
recipients’ decisions about sourcing internationally for their supply chains – a limitation
that may discourage or control the degree of subsidization.
The third instance of potential under-regulation addressed in the book concerns the
interaction of environmental protection and foreign direct investment. In Chapter 6,8
Firger and Gerrard conclude that the interaction between these two matters is, at
present, episodic at best, with environmental protection generally pursued through
domestic regulation, and foreign investment regulated largely at the international level,
principally through a complex web of international investment agreements. While
recognizing the beneﬁts of regulatory harmonization at the international level, the
authors also, and refreshingly, acknowledge the beneﬁts of the resulting ‘rule diversity’
on environmental regulation, above and beyond the beneﬁts of harmonization.9 Like
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern, who explore empirical evidence on the impact of
heightened labor standards on foreign investment in Chapter 4, Firger and Gerrard note
that heightened environmental regulation can in some instances attract, rather than
drive away, foreign investment. Nonetheless, the authors highlight recent, albeit
nascent, trends toward modiﬁcation of international investment agreements to retain
policy space for states to pursue environmental objectives without triggering claims of
regulatory expropriation, failures of fair and equitable treatment, or discrimination.
The fourth area of potential under-regulation relates to international technology
transfer, and the complexities of balancing investment protections that promote such
transfer against the need for legitimate regulatory space. In Chapter 7,10 Maskus
emphasizes the importance of technology transfer as a catalyst for economic growth,
while questioning whether the complex interface of protections under the TRIPS
Agreement, preferential trade agreements, and bilateral investment treaties are effective
in encouraging the transfer of technology across borders. Regrettably, the author
declines to make a clear case either for or against greater harmonization of the
5 Chapter 5, p. 225.
6 Chapter 5, p. 207.
7 Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 expressly permits governments to discriminate by making subsidies
available solely to domestic producers.
8 Chapter 6, Daniel M. Firger and Michael B. Gerrard, ‘Environmental Protection’.
9 Chapter 6, p. 256.
10 Chapter 7, Keith E. Maskus, ‘Technology Transfer: Regulatory Issues and International Investment
Agreements’.
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protections afforded to intellectual property rights under these different regimes.
Instead, he focuses on the tensions facing developing countries as they adopt
increasingly rigorous intellectual property protections in an effort to attract technology
ﬂows, and in so doing sacriﬁce the ability to pursue important social objectives.
Interestingly, however, the author suggests that a ‘race to the bottom’ in this area, if it
ever really existed, has been arrested and perhaps reversed due to a major pushback in
current negotiations at World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) against any
further strengthening of global intellectual property rights.11 Maskus provides an
articulate explanation of competing policy priorities in this area, but does not offer any
overarching approach to reconcile them.
The ﬁfth instance of potential under-regulation relates to the controversial investment
activities of sovereign wealth funds, a number of which the authors note originate from
undemocratic governments with poor track records on human rights. In Chapter 8,12
Barbary and Bortolotti analyze the market performance of companies following
investment by sovereign wealth funds, and ﬁnd that the heightened political risk of
authoritarian investor countries has a negative impact on the performance of target
companies. They predict that, if unchecked, continued investment by such countries
could have systemic consequences, adversely affecting international capital movements
and ﬁnancial integration. This concern leads the authors to advocate a new multilateral
regulatory framework, which would be administered by a ‘Sovereign Investment
Ofﬁce’.13 This Ofﬁce would be charged with setting common rules and enforcing them
through the publication of a list evaluating sovereign wealth funds as either ‘politically
risk-neutral’ or requiring action to address human rights and democratic transition at
home. While rightly conceding that such a framework is unlikely in the near future, the
authors seem to underestimate the challenge of building a consensus around common
rules of this kind, which they unapologetically argue should be directed towards
political change. The more fundamental question of whether it is desirable for
governments – domestic or foreign, democratic or authoritarian – to acquire controlling
interests in important sectors of the global economy is left unaddressed. Ultimately,
Barbary and Bortolotti’s contribution succeeds in identifying an area of real concern,
and in highlighting the need for recipient and investor governments alike to engage in
these issues without delay.
The sixth instance relates to increasingly common concerns about possible national
security threats posed by foreign acquisition. In Chapter 10,14 Moran offers a useful
framework to enable governments assessing proposed foreign acquisitions to separate
genuine threats to national security from implausible objections, which are often
nothing more than disguised protectionism. The author sets forth a decision-tree for
making such assessments based on the application of two tests. The ﬁrst is a ‘criticality
test’15 applied to three categories of potential threat, in each case requiring an analysis
11 Chapter 7, pp. 300–301.
12 Chapter 8, Victoria Barbary and Bernardo Bortolotti, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Political Risk: New
Challenges in the Regulation of Foreign Investment’.
13 Chapter 8, pp. 337–338.
14 Chapter 10, Theodore H. Moran, ‘Foreign Acquisitions and National Security: What Are Genuine
Threats? What are Implausible Worries?’.
15 Chapter 10, pp. 382–385.
594 B O O K R E V I E W S
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745614000184
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:44:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
of the costs or damages that would result if the threat materialized. The second is a
‘plausible threat test’,16 which involves an analysis of whether there are widely available
substitutes for the goods and services of the target company in global markets,
competitive suppliers in global markets, and low switching costs. The author proposes
that this analysis of market control could be informed by well-established guidelines on
mergers and acquisitions, such as those applied by the US and EU. Only if a proposed
foreign acquisition scores high on both the criticality and plausible threat tests would a
country be justiﬁed in blocking it. By providing a framework for rigorous analysis of
proposed foreign acquisitions through the application of well-accepted market control
tests, the author offers a nuanced model for foreign investment review that countries
might ﬁnd acceptable for both inbound and outbound investment. Moran seeks to
move the charged debate over foreign acquisitions beyond political posturing to hard
economic analysis, and in so doing makes an important contribution to this volume.
The seventh such issue involves the challenges posed by international investment
agreements, and in particular the threat of investor-state dispute settlement, to
regulatory reform in the public services sector. In Chapter 11,17 Ortino makes the
case that, while investment protections against, inter alia, expropriation and failure of
fair and equitable treatment make regulatory change in any sector challenging, the
challenges are particularly heightened in the public services sphere. Public interest
concerns surrounding the provision of public services lead to heavy and complex
regulation, with the potential for even small changes to trigger allegations of investment
treaty violations. Moreover, given the public interest concerns at stake, regulatory
changes in the public services sector are often anything but small, with the record of
investment disputes replete with examples of governments reversing privatization of
public services in a bid to right perceived wrongs. The result is a series of prominent
international investment disputes demonstrating the limits placed on regulatory change
in the public services sphere, particularly where governments have afforded both
investment liberalization and investment protection in their international investment
agreements.
We turn next to the second major theme of the book, in which the authors diagnose
current regulatory disciplines as woefully fragmented, and the need for harmonization
as critical. The appeal of harmonization for foreign investment is relatively clear; in a
message reinforced repeatedly by the authors, above all investment craves stability, and
stability comes, in part, from consistent and predictable regulatory treatment across
jurisdictions and fora. As previewed by Drabek and Mavroidis in their Introduction,
foreign investment is frustrated not by regulation, but rather by the fragmentory nature
of regulation.
Across the chapters of the book dedicated to this theme, the authors assess the degree
of harmonization in the regulation of foreign investment achieved thus far in at least
two senses: at what level of regulation has harmonization been achieved (domestic,
regional, or international); and what type of harmonization has been achieved
16 Chapter 10, pp. 385–388.
17 Chapter 11, Federico Ortino, ‘Public Services, Investment Liberalization and Protection’.
B O O K R E V I E W S 595
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745614000184
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:44:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
(substantive or procedural). At the same time, they consider what the optimal level of
harmonization would be.
In Chapter 1,18 Mavroidis traces the history of the regulation of foreign investment
through international trade rules, to explain why we have achieved no comprehensive
multilateral agreement on investment protection, and instead continue to hobble along
with a patchwork investment rules contained in thousands of bilateral investment
treaties and preferential trade agreements.
In Chapter 2,19 Huerta Goldman engages in a comparative study of the different
approaches taken by three Latin American countries – Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico – to
the three possible levels for regulating foreign investment, i.e., domestic law, bilateral
investment treaties, and the WTO. While all three domestic legal systems have some
protection against discrimination based on nationality, they also contain the Calvo
Clause favoring domestic over foreign investment. At the other end of the spectrum, the
author correctly highlights the limits of the WTO system in protecting foreign
investment, due to the fact that investors have no standing, and that only softer legal
remedies are available as compared to bilateral investment treaties. After considering
the potential for cross-fertilization between the WTO system and bilateral investment
treaties, the author ultimately concludes that bilateral investment treaties hold the
greatest promise for encouraging inbound investment and protecting outbound
investment as these countries evolve into new globally active investors. Huerta
Goldman thus questions the decision by Bolivia to renounce a number of bilateral
investment treaties and by Brazil to avoid them altogether, and suggests that these
countries should instead consider upgrading domestic investors to foreign treatment so
as to resolve the conﬂict with the Calvo Clause and promote better protection for all.
In Chapter 3,20 De Meester and Coppens assess whether a current platform, the
WTO’s GATS, is a viable model for achieving the type of stable and predictable
regulatory discipline investment craves. Ultimately, and while emphasizing the
important role the GATS plays as a multilateral market opening tool for investment,
the authors conclude that the GATS is not an optimal tool. First and foremost, the
authors note that the GATS is limited as a model for disciplining investment-related
measures by virtue of its scope, which protects investments only to the extent they are
made to supply services through a commercial presence in a host country, and only to
the extent that the host country has made a speciﬁc commitment in the services sector at
hand. Moreover, even if the authors overstate somewhat the impotence of GATS
disciplines on ‘investment-hampering’ measures, they accurately observe that the GATS
fails to discipline ‘investment-attracting’ measures. Speciﬁcally, the authors make a
compelling case that the GATS non-discrimination provisions offer little discipline on
distortive investment-attracting measures, such as location subsidies.
In Chapter 9,21 Hirsh argues that, notwithstanding fragmented substantive rules
contained in over 2,600 bilateral investment treaties and the ad hoc constitution of
18 Chapter 1, Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Regulation of Investment in the Trade Régime: From ITO to WTO’.
19 Chapter 2, Jorge A. Huerta Goldman, ‘Domestic, Regional and Multilateral Investment Liberalization’.
20 Chapter 3, Bart De Meester and Dominic Coppens, ‘Mode 3 of the GATS: A Model for Disciplining
Measures Affecting Investment Flows?’.
21 Chapter 9, Moshe Hirsch, ‘International Tribunals as Agents of Harmonization’.
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arbitral tribunals under these treaties, international investment law today generally
represents a coherent and consistent body of law. The author attributes this legal
harmonization, in part at least, to the pivotal role played by international investment
tribunals. While noting that such tribunals are not bound by any formal doctrine of
precedent, the author argues that a de facto practice of precedent has emerged,
enhancing stability and predictability in this legal sphere. This practice is said to be the
result of two main factors – repeat nominations of a small group of individuals to
investment tribunals, and the particular sensitivity of this group to the need to develop
coherent jurisprudence in order to maintain the legitimacy of the investment arbitral
system. This, of course, begs the question of whether legal harmonization achieved
through such means is indeed legitimate. But Hirsh is careful to note that this
harmonization has its limits. Investment tribunals do not always follow previous
decisions, particularly where no consensus has crystallized around new issues. While
not mentioned by the author, the highly fact-intensive and treaty-speciﬁc nature of
many investment disputes also limits the inﬂuence of previous case law. Moreover,
Hirsh correctly emphasizes that sovereign states continue to play an important role in
investment law-making, inter alia, by refusing to enforce unacceptable investment
awards in domestic legal systems, opposing the nomination of certain arbitrators to
future tribunals, issuing interpretative notes, and modifying future investment treaties.
In Chapter 12,22 Beviglia Zampetti and Brown describe the European Union’s
evolving experience with investment regulation, from a matter exclusively in the hands
of its member States to the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent transfer
of negotiating and legislative competence to the European Union itself. While it is too
early for the authors to assess whether the concentration of competence over investment
regulation into the hands of the European Union will result in a corpus of treaty law
that can serve as a model for harmonization at an international level, they clearly hope
it will. The authors address the integration, into its most recent partnership and free
trade agreements, of disciplines ‘to prevent abuses by investors, and to guarantee that
investment liberalization does not result in social or environmental harm’,23 which have
led to the inclusion of provisions on environmental protection, sustainable develop-
ment, labor standards, and the like. At the same time, they emphasize that recent EU
agreements leave room for governments to preserve industrial policy choices on matters
such as subsidization and privatization initiatives.24 While the authors favor
harmonization of investment regulation, their clear preference is to leave time for
experience under the Lisbon Treaty to take hold, enabling harmonization in a distinctly
EU image.
Finally, in Chapter 13,25 Drabek rehearses the main arguments in favor of greater
harmonization of foreign investment rules, as well as the serious theoretical and
practical obstacles to achieving this objective. Arguments in favor of regulatory
diversity are considered, but they are essentially analyzed as impediments to
harmonization. An unduly pessimistic assessment of the WTO’s ability to deliver
22 Chapter 12, Americo Beviglia Zampetti and Colin Brown, ‘The EU Approach to Investment’.
23 Chapter 12, p. 428.
24 Chapter 12, p. 428.
25 Chapter 13, Zdenek Drabek, ‘Harmonization of Rules on Foreign Investment’.
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effective harmonized rules leads the author to consider possible ‘pragmatic solutions’
for arriving at a consensus.26 But these too are found wanting due to the challenges of
identifying common ground in any multilateral negotiations involving a large and
diverse group of sovereign states. Rigorous cost–beneﬁt analysis of proposed regulatory
approaches is posited as one possible solution, but the author ultimately concludes that
the practical difﬁculties of conducting such analysis are at present insurmountable. The
reader is thus left to hope that ‘better data and a stronger theory will make a difference
in the future’.27
Taken as a whole, the remarkable collection of papers assembled by Drabek and
Mavroidis succeeds both in identifying and explaining in clear terms the most salient
questions in the regulation of foreign investment today. Considering the complexity of
these questions, it is not surprising that these papers are less successful in offering
convincing answers as to the best way forward. The reader will be conscious of a
general bias – one which is explicit in the title of this collection – in favor of more
regulation and greater international harmonization. Whether or not one shares this
perspective, the diversity of themes covered in this book make it essential reading for
anyone interested in an accessible overview of the latest developments in the regulation
of foreign investment.
TODD J. FRIEDBACHER and DAVID P. RONEY, Geneva ofﬁce of Sidley Austin LLP,
Switzerland28
doi:10.1017/S1474745614000196
The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conﬂict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for
the World Economy
by Michael Pettis
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013
Those who believe global trade imbalances were the cause of the great recession will
ﬁnd much to like in The Great Rebalancing. The book sets out to demystify global
imbalances, explaining their role in the distribution of growth around the world. It
succeeds in debunking the myth that surplus countries are virtuous and thrifty, while
deﬁcit countries are dissolute and proﬂigate. It explains how instead surpluses and
deﬁcits are driven by government policies at home and abroad. It also refutes the
prevailing wisdom that the dollar’s role as a reserve currency is an exorbitant privilege;
rather, it is an exorbitant burden because it puts thousands of US jobs in the hands of
dollar reserve hoarders. The book places global imbalances squarely at the center of
both the global ﬁnancial crisis and the Euro crisis, and promotes rebalancing as critical
for global growth and stability. It will help an educated reader understand why
26Chapter 13, p. 480.
27 Chapter 13, p. 481.
28Messrs. Friedbacher and Roney are partners in the Geneva ofﬁce of Sidley Austin LLP. The views expressed
in this review are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the views of Sidley Austin LLP or any of its
clients.
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